 Examining Both Sides of the Transaction: Bargaining in the Housing MarketDarren K. Hayunga and Henry J. Munneke Real Estate Economics, 2021, vol. 49, issue 2, 663-691 Abstract: This article examines the bargaining power and information advantages of housing market participants with special interest in the outcomes of individuals compared to real estate agents. Prior studies examining agents’ sales of their own properties find that they obtain higher prices than their clients, which is notable because it suggests a possible conflict of interest. In addition to reexamining agents’ sales after correcting for a simultaneity issue, we consider agents’ purchases of their own properties as well as the sales and purchases of the other market participants. Agents’ purchases offer direct evidence of their ability to transact while in competition with other market participants without the potential conflict of interest. The results demonstrate that agents hold bargaining power relative to individuals. Companies (investors) also exhibit bargaining power over individuals, which seems to concentrate in vacant properties as well as during economic expansionary periods. Date: 2021 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:reesec:v:49:y:2021:i:2:p:663-691 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Real Estate Economics is currently edited by Crocker Liu, N. Edward Coulson and Walter Torous More articles in Real Estate Economics from American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association Contact information at EDIRC. |
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