Liberalizing NAFTA Rules of Origin: A Dynamic CGE Analysis

Patrick Georges

Review of International Economics, 2008, vol. 16, issue 4, 672-691

Abstract: Most computable general‐equilibrium (CGE) studies assessing the welfare impact of moving from a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to a deeper form of integration, for example a customs union (CU), typically proxy the integration as the adoption of a common external tariff toward the rest of the world. However, a CU is also an arrangement that allows for the elimination of FTAs' preferential rules of origin (ROO), which is typically not captured in CGE studies. This paper addresses the issue using a multicountry, multisector dynamic CGE model. Although the removal of distortionary ROO is likely to lower the unit costs of production within North America, it may also deteriorate North American terms of trade with the rest of the world. Thus, the net effect of the removal of NAFTA ROO on welfare is ambiguous and is an empirical issue.

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2008.00771.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:reviec:v:16:y:2008:i:4:p:672-691

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0965-7576

Access Statistics for this article

Review of International Economics is currently edited by E. Kwan Choi

More articles in Review of International Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().