PLEA BARGAINING AS A GAME: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATED SENTENCING DECISIONS

Ronald A. Harris and J. Fred Springer

Review of Policy Research, 1984, vol. 4, issue 2, 245-258

Abstract: Current studies of courtroom decisionmaking emphasize contextual variation and the interaction of large numbers of variables In explaining decision outcomes. However, theory suggests that courtroom decisions may be dominated by simple “rules of thumb” that allow decisionmakers to cope with scarcity of time and resources. Following this approach, a parslmonious model of plea bargaining as a two‐person game is developed and hypotheses are derived. Data on negotiated sentences for burglary and robbery in three California counties serve to test the hypotheses. The findings confirm that prior criminal history is the dominant factor in determining the severity of negotiated sentences and that defendents with more extensive prior records have less incentive to plea bargalh. Identlfication of this decision rule for negotiated sentences contradlcts arguments for limiting plea bargaining that assume negotiations result in sentencing leniency across the board.

Date: 1984
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