Bank regulation and bank crisis

Sigbjørn Atle Berg and Øyvind Eitrheim
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Sigbjørn Atle Berg: Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway)

No 2009/18, Working Paper from Norges Bank

Abstract: The Norwegian experiences of the past thirty years illustrate what we believe are two general tendencies in bank regulation. The first one is that a bank crisis will tend to focus regulators' minds and lead to stricter regulations. The second one is that cycles in regulation tend to interact with the economic cycle, in the sense that the rationale for strong regulation tends to become somewhat blurred when the economy is booming. These patterns appear in the Norwegian experience after the banking crisis of 1988-92, and they can presumably also be recognized in many other jurisdictions.

Keywords: Banking crises; history of bank regulation; capital adequacy; Basel I & II (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G28 N44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2009-10-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-his, nep-reg and nep-rmg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bno:worpap:2009_18

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