Effort Complementarity and Sharing Rules in Group Contests

Hideo Konishi and Katsuya Kobayashi
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Katsuya Kobayashi: Hosei University

No 1024, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper, we consider a prize-sharing rule design problem in a group contest with effort complementarities within groups by employing a CES effort aggregator function. We derive the conditions for a monopolization rule that dominates an egalitarian rule if the objective of the rule design is to maximize the group's winning probability. We find conditions under which the monopolization rule maximizes the group's winning probability, while the egalitarian rule is strictly preferred by all members of the group. Without effort complementarity, there cannot be such a conflict of interest.

Keywords: group contest; complementarity in efforts; free riding; prize sharing rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D23 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-04-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-ore
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Journal Article: Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:1024

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