Allocation Mechanisms Without Reduction

David Dillenberger () and Uzi Segal
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David Dillenberger: University of Pennsylvania

No 1027, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: We study a simple variant of the house allocation problem (one-sided matching). We demonstrate that agents with recursive preferences may systematically prefer one allocation mechanism to the other, even among mechanisms that are considered to be the same in standard models, in the sense that they induce the same probability distribution over successful matchings. Using this, we propose a new Priority Groups mechanism and provide conditions under which it is preferred to two popular mechanisms, Random Top Cycle and Random Serial Dictatorship.

Keywords: House allocation problem; Non-expected utility; Random Top Cycle; Random Serial Dictatorship; Reduction of compound lotteries. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-02-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Allocation Mechanisms without Reduction (2021)
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