Stability in Matching with Externalities: Pairs Competition and Oligopolistic Joint Ventures

Kenzo Imamura (), Hideo Konishi and Chen-Yu Pan
Additional contact information
Kenzo Imamura: University of Tokyo Market Design Center

No 1039, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper presents one-to-one matching and assignment problems with externalities across pairs such as pairs figure skating competition and joint ventures in oligopolistic markets. In these models, players care not only about their partners but also which and how many rival pairs are formed. Thus, it is important for a deviating pair to know which matching will realize after it deviates from a matching (an effectiveness function) in order to define pairwise stable matching. Using a natural effectiveness function for such environments, we show that the assortative matching is pairwise stable. We discuss two generalizations of our model including intrinsic preferences on partners and pair-specific match qualities to see how our stability concept performs in these generalized models.

Keywords: one-to-one matching; matching with externalities; pairwise stable matching; coalition formation; group contest; joint ventures; myopia; farsightedness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-11-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/wp1039.pdf main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Stability in matching with externalities: Pairs competition and oligopolistic joint ventures (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:1039

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill MA 02467 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F Baum ().