School Choice: An Experimental Study

Yan Chen and Tayfun Sönmez

No 622, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: We present an experimental study of three school choice mechanisms. The Boston mechanism is influential in practice, while the two alternative mechanisms, the Gale-Shapley and Top Trading Cycles mechanisms, have superior theoretical properties in terms of incentives and efficiency. Consistent with theory, this study indicates a high preference manipulation rate under the Boston mechanism. As a result, efficiency under Boston is significantly lower than that of the two competing mechanisms in the designed environment. However, contrary to theory, Gale-Shapley outperforms the Top Trading Cycles mechanism and generates the highest efficiency. Our results suggest that replacing the Boston mechanism with either Gale-Shapley or Top Trading Cycles mechanism might significantly improve efficiency, however, the efficiency gains are likely to be more profound when parents are educated about the incentive compatibility of these mechanisms.

Keywords: school choice; Boston mechanism; mechanism design; Gale-Shapley mechanism; Top Trading Cycles mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C92 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2004-10-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

Forthcoming, Journal of Economic Theory

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Journal Article: School choice: an experimental study (2006)
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