Kidney Exchange with Good Samaritan Donors: A Characterization

Tayfun Sönmez and Utku Unver

No 640, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze mechanisms to kidney exchange with good samaritan donors where exchange is feasible not only among donor-patient pairs but also among such pairs and non-directed alturistic donors. We show that you request my donor-I get your turn mechanism (Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [1999]) is the only mechanism that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, strategy-proof, weakly neutral and consistent.

Keywords: Kidney exchange; matching; strategy-proofness; consistency. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2006-02-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Forthcoming as "House Allocation with Existing Tenants: A Characterization", Games and Economic Behavior

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