Corporate Board Turnover and Securities Fraud Litigation: Some new evidence from case outcomes

Christopher Baum, James Bohn and Atreya Chakraborty ()
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James Bohn: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston

No 664, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine the relationship between outcomes of securities fraud class action lawsuits (SFCAs) and corporate board turnover rates. Our results indicate the strength of the allegations in lawsuits affects board turnover. The turnover rates for each type of board member: outsiders, insiders, and CEOs are higher when a lawsuit is settled relative to those that are dismissed. Turnover rates of outside directors are more sensitive to the outcome of the SFCA among firms with higher levels of external blockholdings and those with greater institutional ownership. These results support the view that firms act to impose sanctions on those individuals associated with fraudulent activities.

Keywords: Securities fraud class actions; board turnover; corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-04-28, Revised 2016-05-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cfn, nep-law and nep-reg
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published 2016, International Review of Law and Economics, 48, 14-25

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:664

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