Regulation, Imperfect Competition, and the U.S. Abortion Market

Andrew Beauchamp

No 811, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: The market for abortion in the U.S. has become increasingly concentrated in recent years and many states have tightened abortion regulations aimed at providers. Using unique data on abortion providers I estimate a dynamic model of entry, exit and service provision which captures the effect of regulation on provider behavior. High fixed costs explain the growth of large clinics and estimates show regulation increased entry costs for small providers. A simulation removing all regulations increases entry by smaller providers into incumbent-markets: competition increases as does the number of abortions. Targeted entry subsidies, however, increase access while only slightly increase abortion.

Keywords: abortion; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J13 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-08-17, Revised 2013-10-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-dem and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boc:bocoec:811

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