Partisan and Bipartisan Gerrymandering

Hideo Konishi and Chen-Yu Pan

No 922, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper analyzes the optimal partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering policies in a model with electoral competitions in policy positions and transfer promises. With complete freedom in redistricting, partisan gerrymandering policy generates the most one-sidedly biased district profile, while bipartisan gerrymandering generates the most polarized district profile. In contrast, with limited freedom in gerrymandering, both partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering tend to prescribe the same policy. Friedman and Holden (2009) find no significant empirical difference between bipartisan and partisan gerrymandering in explaining incumbent reelection rates. Our result suggests that gerrymanderers may not be as free in redistricting as popularly thought.

Keywords: electoral competition; partisan gerrymandering; bipartisan gerrymandering; policy convergence/divergence; pork-barrel politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-11-01, Revised 2018-08-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-pol and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering (2020)
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