Equilibria in Bottleneck Games

Ryo Kawasaki, Hideo Konishi and Junki Yukawa

No 945, Boston College Working Papers in Economics from Boston College Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper introduces a bottleneck game with finite sets of commuters and departing time slots as an extension of congestion games by Milchtaich (1996). After characterizing Nash equilibrium of the game, we provide sufficient conditions for which the equivalence between Nash and strong equilibria holds. Somewhat surprisingly, unlike in congestion games, a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies may often fail to exist, even when players are homogeneous. In contrast, when there is a continuum of atomless players, the existence of a Nash equilibrium and the equivalence between the set of Nash and strong equilibria hold as in congestion games (Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber, 1997a).

Keywords: congestion game; bottleneck model; Nash equlibrium; strong equilibrium; equivalence; existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 R41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-01-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-tre
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Journal Article: Equilibria in bottleneck games (2023)
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