Scalable games: modelling games of incomplete information

Peter Eccles and Nora Wegner ()

No 641, Bank of England working papers from Bank of England

Abstract: We provide conditions to allow modelling situations of asymmetric information in a tractable manner. In addition, we show a novel relationship between certain games of asymmetric information and corresponding games of symmetric information. This framework establishes links between certain games separately studied in the literature. The class of games considered is defined by scalable preference relations and a scalable information structure. We show that this framework can be used to solve asymmetric contests and auctions with loss aversion.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; linear equilibria; global games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2017-01-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boe:boeewp:0641

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