Taking regulation seriously: fire sales under solvency and liquidity constraints
Jamie Coen (),
Caterina Lepore and
Eric Schaanning ()
Additional contact information
Jamie Coen: London School of Economics
Eric Schaanning: RiskLab, ETH ZÜrich and Norges Bank
No 793, Bank of England working papers from Bank of England
Abstract:
We build a framework for modelling fire sales where banks face both liquidity and solvency constraints and choose which assets to sell in order to minimise liquidation losses. Banks constrained by the leverage ratio prefer to first sell assets that are liquid and held in small amounts, while banks constrained by the risk-weighted capital ratio and the liquidity coverage ratio need to trade off assets’ liquidity with their regulatory weights. We calibrate the model to the UK banking system, and find that banks’ optimal liquidation strategies translate into moderate fire-sale losses even for extremely large solvency shocks. By contrast, severe funding shocks can generate significant losses. Thus models focusing exclusively on solvency risk may significantly underestimate the extent of contagion via fire sales. Moreover, when studying combined funding and solvency shocks, we find complementarities between the two shocks’ effects that cannot be reproduced by focusing on either shock in isolation.
Keywords: Banks; financial regulation; fire sales; stress testing; systemic risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G18 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 53 pages
Date: 2019-04-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cba, nep-ore and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/ ... dity-constraints.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:boe:boeewp:0793
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Bank of England working papers from Bank of England Bank of England, Threadneedle Street, London, EC2R 8AH. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Digital Media Team ().