Using Cheap Talk to Polarize or Unify a Group of Decision Makers

Daeyoung Jeong ()
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Daeyoung Jeong: Economic Research Institute, Bank of Korea

No 2017-19, Working Papers from Economic Research Institute, Bank of Korea

Abstract: We develop a model of strategic information transmission from an outside expert with informational superiority to a group of people who make a decision by voting on a proposal. An outside expert who observes the qualities of a proposal sends a cheap talk message to decision makers with limited information. A simple cheap talk strategy of the expert can be surprisingly effective in persuading decision makers by polarizing or unifying their opinions. When there is a significant informational gap, decision makers vote in the expert's interest by focusing only on the expert's message, even though they know she has her own bias.

Keywords: Cheap Talk; Voting; Polarization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 D78 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57 pages
Date: 2017-06-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
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http://papers.bok.or.kr/RePEc_attach/wpaper/english/wp-2017-19.pdf Working Paper, 2017 (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bok:wpaper:1719

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