International Monetary Cooperation Under Tariff Threats

Giorgio Basevi (), Flavio Delbono and Vincenzo Denicolo' ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We analyze games between two countries that use the tariff as a threat to induce each other to follow monetary policies equivalent to those that would obtain under a cooperative game. The analysis shows that under certain assumptions concerning the shares of tariff revenues that the countries spend on imports, the punishment structure, and the discount factors, the outcome of the games converges to a monetary policies. It is suggested that the model could be applaied to current relations between the US, Germany and Japan.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-int and nep-mon
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://amsacta.unibo.it/5374/1/40.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: International monetary cooperation under tariff threats (1990)
Working Paper: International Monetary Cooperation under Tariff Threats (1988)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:40

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna ().