Differential Oligopoly Games where the Closed-Loop Memoryless and Open-Loop Equilibria Coincide

Roberto Cellini and Luca Lambertini ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We illustrate two differential oligopoly games using, respectively, the capital accumulation dynamics la Nerlove-Arrow, and the capital accumulation dynamics la Ramsey. We prove that these games benefit from the property that closed-loop memoryless solutions degenerate into open-loop solutions, since the best reply of a generic firm is independent of the rivals state variables, which entails that the cross e ect from rivals states to own controls disappears.

Date: 2001
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:402

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