On MQS regulation, innovation and market coverage

Emanuele Bacchiega, Luca Lambertini () and Andrea Mantovani

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We revisit Maxwell s (1998) analysis to show that MQS regulation has no effects on the high-quality firm s incentive to adopt a more efficient technology in a vertically differentiated duopoly with full market coverage and convex costs of quality improvements which are independent of the scale of production.

Date: 2006-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-reg
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Journal Article: On MQS regulation, innovation and market coverage (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:575

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