A remark on the experimental evidence from tacit coordination games

L. Bagnoli and G. Negroni

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: This paper proposes an interpretation of the experimental evidence on tacit coordination games involving randomly matched players provided by Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil (1990), based on the notion of stochastic stability. When the model is calibrated with the parameters chosen in the experiment, it predicts that every strict Nash equilibrium is stochastically stable; therefore, in the long run we should not observe the emergence of any particular pattern of behavior, as suggested by the experimental evidence. The model is also compatible with the experimental evidence provided by Goeree and Holt (2005).

Date: 2008-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://amsacta.unibo.it/4623/1/627.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:627

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna ().