Credit availability in the crisis: which role for the European Investment Bank Group?

Alessandro Fedele, Andrea Mantovani and F. Liucci

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: In this paper we consider a moral hazard problem between a creditworthy firm which needs funding and a bank. We first study under which conditions the firm does not obtain the loan. We then determine whether and how the intervention of an external financial institution can facilitate the access to credit. In particular, we focus on the European Investment Bank Group (EIBG), which provides (i) specific credit lines to help banks that finance small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)and (ii) guarantees for portfolios of SMEs'loans. We show that only during crises the EIBG intervention allows to totally overcome the credit crunch.

JEL-codes: D21 D82 G01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-bec, nep-cta and nep-eec
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Credit Availability in the crisis: which role for the European Investment Bank Group? (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:699

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