Government fiscal efforts vs. labour union strikes. Strategic substitutes or complements?

M. Castellani, Luca Fanelli () and Marco Savioli

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: To unveil the strategic interaction between the government and the labour union in a unionised economy, a policy-game model is estimated by cointegrated Vector Autoregressive system using Italian quarterly data (1960-2009) on government budget surplus (fiscal efforts), hours not worked (strikes), unemployment and real wages. The long-run cointegration relationships are interpreted as the players' reaction functions and the long-run equilibrium as the equilibrium of the game. The identification of the long-run cointegration relationships allows indeed to determine if efforts and strikes are strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Finally, speed of long-run adjustment provides insights about the effectiveness of government and labour union strategies.

JEL-codes: C32 C54 C72 E62 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene, nep-env and nep-ino
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://amsacta.unibo.it/4285/1/WP1013.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp1013

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna ().