On the Observational Equivalence of Unilateral Delegation Contracts in Duopoly

Flavio Delbono and Luca Lambertini ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: In a Cournot duopoly, if only one firm hires a manager while the other remains entrepreneurial, the Cournot-Stackelberg equilibrium emerges, with the managerial firm as the leader. This happens under at least three different delegation schemes. We illustrate the different meachanisms driving this outcome through the analysis of the map of best replies at the market stage.

JEL-codes: D43 L13 L21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-cta
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