On Prices' Cyclical Behaviour in Oligopolistic Markets

Luca Lambertini () and L. Marattin

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We revisit the discussion about the relationship between price s cyclical features, implicit collusion and the demand level in an oligopoly supergame where a positive shock may hit demand and disrupt collusion. The novel feature of our model consists in characterising the post-shock noncooperative price and comparing it against the cartel price played in the last period of the collusive path, to single out the conditions for procyclicality to arise both in the short and in the long-run.

JEL-codes: C73 E60 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mac
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://amsacta.unibo.it/5089/1/WP1064.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: On prices’ cyclical behaviour in oligopolistic markets (2021)
Working Paper: On Prices' Cyclical Behaviour in Oligopolistic Markets (2016)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp1064

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna ().