Low-Quality Leadership in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly with Cournot Competition

Luca Lambertini () and Alessandro Tampieri

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We model a vertically differentiated duopoly with quantity-setting firms as an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage, to show that at the subgame perfect equilibrium sequential play obtains, with the low-quality firm taking the leader's role.

JEL-codes: C73 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-com
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Related works:
Journal Article: Low-quality leadership in a vertically differentiated duopoly with Cournot competition (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp750

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