Open Innovation in a Dynamic Cournot Duopoly

I. Hasnas, Luca Lambertini () and Arsen Palestini ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We analyze an Open Innovation process in a Cournot duopoly using a differential game approach where knowledge spillovers are endogenously determined via the R&D process. The game produces multiple steady states, allowing for an asymmetric solution where a firm may trade off the R&D investment against information absorption from the rival.

JEL-codes: C73 L13 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-tid
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Related works:
Journal Article: Open Innovation in a dynamic Cournot duopoly (2014)
Working Paper: Open Innovation in a dynamic Cournot duopoly (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp753

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