Improving Compliance With Preventive Care: Cooperation in Mutual Health Insurance

Francesca Barigozzi, Renaud Bourlès (), Dominique Henriet and Giuseppe Pignataro

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: Preventive care should be subsidized in traditional insurance contracts since policyholders ignore the benefit of their prevention choice on the insurance premium (Ellis and Manning, 2007 JHE). We study participating policies as risk-sharing agreements among policyholders who decide how much to invest in secondary prevention. We explore under which conditions these policies allow partial or even full internalization of prevention benefits in an environment with repeated interactions between policy holders. Welfare generated by the risk-sharing agreement is increasing with the size of the pool, but at the same time the pool size must not be too large for cooperation to sustain the internalization benefits.

JEL-codes: D82 I11 I13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-ias
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Pool size and the sustainability of optimal risk-sharing agreements (2017)
Working Paper: Pool size and the sustainability of optimal risk-sharing agreements (2017)
Working Paper: Risk-sharing with self-insurance: the role of cooperation (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp765

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