Efficient Horizontal Mergers in Polluting Industries with Cournot Competition

Luca Lambertini () and Alessandro Tampieri

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We investigate the feasibility of horizontal mergers in a homogeneous triopoly where firms compete in quantities and production is polluting the environment. We show that the degree of alignment between private and social incentives increases in the intensity of pollution.

JEL-codes: L13 L41 Q51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-env and nep-ind
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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