Bankruptcy Remoteness and Incentive-compatible Securitization

Gabriella Chiesa

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: Securitization performs two functions. One refers to the risk allocation between the bank and outside investors; the other consists of creating transferable/liquid securities. A key ingredient of liquid/claimtransferability is bankruptcy remoteness - the insolvency of the sponsor (the loan originator) has no impact on the securities. We explore the implications of bankruptcy remoteness on risk allocation and regulatory/policy issues. Under traditional banking, when debt/deposits coexist with securitization, bankruptcy remoteness amounts to: i) a seniority structure when debt/deposits (the claim that insist on the bank as a whole) have the lowest priority; ii) the bank finds it optimal to grant securities maximum protection - securitization without risk transfer. This constrains incentive-compatible lending below the social optimum, whenever at an optimal allocation not all risk bears on the bank. Policies that implement the social optimum are derived.

JEL-codes: D86 G21 G28 K22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cta and nep-law
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Related works:
Journal Article: Bankruptcy Remoteness and Incentive‐compatible Securitization (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp928

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