Optimal firm' mix in oligopoly with twofold environmental externality

Flavio Delbono and Luca Lambertini ()

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We charaterise the socially optimal mix of firms in an oligopoly with both profit-seeking and labour-managed firms. The policy maker faces a twofold externality: (i) production entails the exploitation of a common pool natural resource and (ii) production/consumption pollutes the environment. We study the relationship between firms' mix and social welfare in the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the industry and the resulting policy implications.

JEL-codes: H23 L13 P13 Q50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-env and nep-ind
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp955

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