Platform Competition: Who Benefits from Multihoming?

Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: Competition between two-sided platforms is shaped by the possibility of multihoming. If initially both sides of platform singlehome, each platform provides users on one side exclusive access to its users on the other side. If then one side multihomes, platforms compete on the singlehoming side and exert monopoly power on the multihoming side. This paper explores the allocative effects of such a change from single- to multihoming. Our results challenge the conventional wisdom, according to which the possibility of multihoming hurts the side that can multihome, while benefiting the other side. This in not always true, as the opposite may happen or both sides may benefit.

Keywords: Network effects; two-sided markets; platform competition; competitive bottleneck; multihoming (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2018-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-mic, nep-pay and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp001 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Platform competition: Who benefits from multihoming? (2019)
Working Paper: Platform competition: Who benefits from multihoming? (2019)
Working Paper: Platform Competition: Who Benefits from Multihoming? (2017)
Working Paper: Platform competition: who benefits from multihoming? (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_001

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany Kaiserstr. 1, 53113 Bonn , Germany.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CRC Office ().