Linear voting rules

Hans Peter Grüner () and Thomas Tröger ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Thomas Troeger

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: How should a society choose between two social alternatives if participation in the decision process is voluntary and costly and monetary transfers are not feasible? Considering symmetric voters with private valuations, we show that it is utilitarian-optimal to use a linear voting rule: votes get alternativedependent weights, and a default obtains if the weighted sum of votes stays below some threshold. Standard quorum rules are not optimal. We develop a perturbation method to characterize equilibria in the case of small participation costs and show that leaving participation voluntary increases welfare for linear rules that are optimal under compulsory participation.

JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 82
Date: 2018-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp002

Related works:
Journal Article: Linear Voting Rules (2019)
Working Paper: Linear voting rules (2018)
Working Paper: Linear voting Rules (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_002

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