Full surplus extraction in mechanism design with information disclosure

Daniel Kraehmer

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: I study mechanism design settings with quasi-linear utility where the principal can provide agents with additional private information about their valuations beyond the private information they hold at the outset. I demonstrate that the principal can design information and a mechanism so as to fully extract the complete information first-best surplus if agents’ ex ante information only affects their beliefs about, yet not their valuations. Otherwise, the result holds if each agent’s initial private beliefs satisfy a spanning condition.

Keywords: information design; mechanism design; quasi-linear utility; rent extraction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 2018-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-upt
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_011

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany Kaiserstr. 1, 53113 Bonn , Germany.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CRC Office ().