Dynamic Expert Incentives: Complementarity and Substitutability in Information Acquisition

Tsz-Ning Wong () and Lily Ling Yang ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: We consider a model of dynamic expertise, in which two experts with the same bias exert efforts over time to discover the state of the world and are able to send verifiable messages about the discovery to a decision maker. We propose a definition of strategic complementarity and substitutability in this setting and find that the experts' information acquisition decisions are always substitutes when the experts are homogeneous, but sometimes complements when the experts are heterogeneous.

Keywords: Information Acquisition; Persuasion; Voluntary Disclosure; Free-riding (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41
Date: 2018-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2018_026

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