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The Dynamics of Motivated Beliefs

Florian Zimmermann

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: A key question in the literature on motivated reasoning and self-deception is how motivated beliefs are sustained in the presence of feedback. In this paper, we explore dynamic motivated belief patterns after feedback. We establish that positive feedback has a persistent effect on beliefs. Negative feedback, instead, influences beliefs in the short-run, but this effect fades over time. We investigate the mechanisms of this dynamic pattern, and provide evidence for an asymmetry in the recall of feedback. Finally, we establish that, in line with theoretical accounts, incentives for belief accuracy mitigate the role of motivated reasoning.

Keywords: Motivated Beliefs; Feedback; Self-Deception; Overconfidence; Selective Recall; Memory; Polarization; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D12 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55
Date: 2019-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-hpe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Journal Article: The Dynamics of Motivated Beliefs (2020) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2019_073

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