Efficient Sequential Screening

Boaz Zik ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: A seller of an item faces a potential buyer whose valuation depends on multiple private signals. When there are informational externalities and the buyer's private signals arrive all at once efficient implementation is impossible. We show that if the buyer's private signals arrive over time in a particular order then the seller can implement efficiency even in the presence of informational externalities.

Keywords: Efficient mechanisms; Sequential screening; Interdependent valuations; Multidimensional information; Informational externalities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D61 D62 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2019-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2019_104

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