Persuasion and Information Aggregation in Elections

Carl Heese () and Stephan Lauermann ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies a large majority election with voters who have heterogeneous, private preferences and exogenous private information about an unknown state of the world. We show that a Bayesian persuader can achieve any state-contingent outcome in some equilibrium by providing additional information. In this setting, without the persuader’s additional information, a version of the Condorcet jury theorem holds, in the sense that outcomes of large elections satisfy full-information equivalence (Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1997). Persuasion does not require detailed knowledge of the voters’ private information, preferences, or the voting rule. It also requires almost no commitment power on the part of the persuader.

Keywords: Voting; Information Aggregation; Persuasion; Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 65
Date: 2019-09, Revised 2024-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2019_128v2

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