Dynamic Competition for Attention

Jan Knoepfle ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies information transmission in situations in which multiple senders compete for the attention of a decision maker. Senders are partially informed about a state and choose how to reveal information over time to attract maximal attention. A decision maker wants to learn about the state but faces attention costs. I characterise an equilibrium with simple strategies that lead to full information transmission in minimal time. The attention each sender receives is proportional to the residual value of her information. With endogenous information acquisition, increasing initial public information may decrease the aggregate information in society.

Keywords: Attention; Dynamic Information Provision; Media Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 D83 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42
Date: 2020-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2020_219

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