Information Design and Career Concerns

David Rodina ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies the interplay between information and incentives in principal-agent relationships with career concerns. I derive conditions for when more precise information about performance or more uncertainty about the agent's ability lead to stronger incentives due to career concerns, absent any ad-hoc restrictions on the production technology or set of information structures. A key condition for deriving these comparative statics is how e ort changes the informativeness of performance signals regarding ability. However, more sophisticated information revelation technologies that are implicitly ruled out in the literature overturn commonly held assertions regarding information design and career concerns.

Keywords: Information; Design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 62
Date: 2020-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hrm and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2020_220

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