Persuading an Informed Committee

Nina Bobkova () and Saskia Klein ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: A biased sender seeks to persuade a committee to vote for a proposal by providing public information about its quality. Each voter has some private information about the proposal's quality. We characterize the sender-optimal disclosure policy under unanimity rule when the sender can versus cannot ask voters for a report about their private information. The sender can only profit from asking agents about their private signals when the private information is sufficiently accurate. For all smaller accuracy levels, a sender who cannot elicit the private information is equally well off.

Keywords: Voting; Bayesian Persuasion; Strategic Voting; Unanimity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50
Date: 2020-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-des and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2020_230

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