Collective Brand Reputation

Volker Nocke and Roland Strausz

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: We develop a theory of collective brand reputation for markets in which product quality is jointly determined by local and global players. In a repeated game of imperfect public monitoring, we model collective branding as a pooling of quality signals generated in different markets. Such pooling yields a beneficial informativeness effect for the actions of a global player present in all markets, but also harmful free-riding by local, market-specific players. The resulting tradeoff yields a theory of optimal brand size and revenue sharing, applying to platform markets, franchising, licensing, umbrella branding, and firms with team production.

Keywords: Collective branding; reputation; free riding; repeated games; imperfect monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D20 D82 L14 L15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51
Date: 2021-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth, nep-ind, nep-ipr and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Collective Brand Reputation (2023)
Working Paper: Collective Brand Reputation (2022)
Working Paper: Collective Brand Reputation (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2021_281

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