Can Media Pluralism Be Harmful to News Quality?

Federico Innocenti ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: I study the effect of polarization and competition on information provision. With a single expert who faces decision-makers with het- erogeneous priors, the expert solves a trade-off between persuading sceptics and retaining believers. With high polarization, an expert has incentives to supply low-quality information to leverage believers' credulity. With multiple experts with opposite biases, competition is harmful if attention is limited. Unbiased and Bayesian decision-makers rationally devote attention to like-minded experts. Echo chambers arise endogenously, whereas decision-makers would be better informed in monopoly. My model can rationalize the spread and persistence of conspiracy theories and fake news.

Keywords: Bayesian Persuasion; Competition; Echo Chambers; Heterogeneous Priors; Limited Attention; Media Pluralism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 L82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45
Date: 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2021_298v2

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