Optimal Information Design of Online Marketplaces with Return Rights

Jonas von Wangenheim ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: Consumer data increasingly enable online marketplaces to identify buyers’ preferences and provide individualized product information. Buyers, however, fully learn their product value only after contracting, when the product is delivered. I characterize the impact of such ex-ante information on buyer surplus and seller surplus, when the seller sets prices and refund conditions in response to the ex-ante information. I show that efficient trade and an arbitrary split of the surplus can be achieved. For the buyer- optimal signal low-valuation buyers remain partially uninformed. Such a signal induces the seller to sell at low prices without refund options.

Keywords: information disclosure; sequential screening; information design; strategic learning; Bayesian persuasion; mechanism design; platform economics; consumer protection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D18 D47 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2022-05, Revised 2024-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-des, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2022_352v2

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