Screening With Frames: Implementation in Extensive Form

Franz Ostrizek and Denis Shishkin

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: We study a decision-framing design problem: a principal faces an agent with frame-dependent preferences and designs an extensive form with a frame at each stage. This allows the principal to circumvent incentive compatibility constraints by inducing dynamically inconsistent choices of the sophisticated agent. We show that a vector of contracts can be implemented if and only if it can be implemented using a canonical extensive form, which has a simple high-low-high structure using only three stages and the two highest frames, and employs unchosen decoy contracts to deter deviations. We then turn to the study of optimal contracts in the context of the classic monopolistic screening problem and establish the existence of a canonical optimal mechanism, even though our implementability result does not directly apply. In the presence of naive types, the principal can perfectly screen by cognitive type and extract full surplus from naifs.

Keywords: Implementation; Screening; Framing; Extensive-Form Decision Problems; Dynamic Inconsistency; Sophistication; Naivete (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D82 D90 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44
Date: 2022-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Related works:
Journal Article: Screening with Frames: Implementation in Extensive Form (2023)
Working Paper: Screening with Frames: Implementation in Extensive Form (2022)
Working Paper: Screening with Frames: Implementation in Extensive Form (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2022_364

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