Enforcing Fintech Competition: Some Reflections on Institutional Design

Jens-Uwe Franck ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: This paper focuses on institutional design aspects of the enforcement of competition law and other procompetitive regulation in fintech markets. Those interventions may prove necessary because the market entry of technology-enabled innovation may depend on accessing other (competing) market operators’ data and facilities or the enabling of data portability and interoperability of complementing financial services. Basic choices of allocating enforcement powers are identified. Five institutional design topics are discussed: bureaucratic enforcement styles and strategies; efficient use of administrative resources; motivation of staff; treatment of conflicting regulatory objectives; and legitimising elements in competition procedures.

Keywords: Fintech; Competition Enforcement; Enforcing Regulation; Institutional Design; Enforcement Style; Regulatory Capture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K20 K21 K22 K23 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2022-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law, nep-pay and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2022_375

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