Search Disclosure

Carl-Christian Groh () and Marcel Preuss ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: We study information sharing between competing sellers in markets where consumers sample sellers sequentially. Sellers can disclose to their rival when they encounter a buyer. Providing this information, which we call search disclosure, can enable all forms of search history-based price discrimination. Yet, firms only conduct search disclosure in equilibrium if search costs are low or price revisions are infeasible. The kind of search disclosure that can emerge in equilibrium leads to price discrimination that reduces consumer surplus and total welfare. However, if firms were mandated to use search disclosure at all times, consumer surplus would be higher.

Keywords: Search; Information Exchange; Antitrust; Price Discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D18 D83 L13 L86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 59
Date: 2022-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2022_384

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