The Digital Markets Act and the Whack-A-Mole Challenge

Jens-Uwe Franck () and Martin Peitz

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: The article addresses the implementation of the Digital Market Act’s rules on ‘anticircumvention’. We present an effects-based approach and propose a three-step procedure to identify whether a certain practice should be conceptualized as circumventing an obligation. We apply this approach to several practices suspected of circumventing the ban on parity clauses and analyse how our results fit into the Digital Market Act’s concept and instruments for avoiding circumvention. Moreover, we elaborate on the role that the anticircumvention rules may play in safeguarding the effectiveness of the restrictions on bundling and self-preferencing in ranking, thus illustrating how they may operate to future-proof the Digital Markets Act but also where their limitations lie.

Keywords: Digital Markets Act; anti-circumvention; antitrust law; price parity clauses; bundling; self-preferencing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39
Date: 2023-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-law, nep-pay and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_439

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