Optimal Security Design for Risk-Averse Investors

Alex Gershkov (), Benny Moldovanu (), Philipp Strack () and Mengxi Zhang ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: We use the tools of mechanism design, combined with the theory of risk measures, to analyze a model where a cash constrained owner of an asset with stochastic returns raises capital from a population of investors that differ in their risk aversion and budget constraints. The distribution of the asset's cash flow is assumed here to be common-knowledge: no agent has private information about it. The issuer partitions and sells the asset's realized cash flow into several asset-backed securities, one for each type of investor. The optimal partition conforms to the commonly observed practice of tranching (e.g., senior debt, junior debt and equity) where senior claims are paid before the subordinate ones. The holders of more senior/junior tranches are determined by the relative risk appetites of the different types of investors and of the issuer, with the more risk averse agents holding the more senior tranches. Tranching endogenously arises here in an optimal mechanism because of simple economic forces: the differences in risk appetites among agents, and in the budget constraints they face.

Keywords: security design; tranching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 F0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48
Date: 2023-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
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