Norms as Obligations

Leonard Hoeft (), Michael Kurschilgen () and Wladislaw Mill

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: Economists model legal compliance as the process of maximizing utility while weighing the consequences from norm violation against other (monetary and non‐monetary) considerations. Legal philosophers, on the other hand, believe that the normative side of law is central. Citizens comply because they have an obligation to do so. Legal norms provide exclusionary reasons that prevent weighing up on other issues. We test and compare both models in a controlled online experiment. We conduct a modified dictator game with partially unknown yet ascertainable payoffs, and vary between treatments the presence and content of authoritative norms. Our experimental results show that ‐‐ in the presence of a norm ‐‐ participants follow norms without searching for information that they deem important in the absence of a norm. This pattern is independent of the specific content of the norm. Our results are consistent with the legal model of norm compliance.

Keywords: Norms; Information; Authority; Willful Ignorance; Dictator Game; Legal Theory; Experi- ment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 D81 D83 K10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24
Date: 2024-11
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Related works:
Journal Article: Norms as obligations (2025)
Working Paper: Norms as Obligations (2022)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2024_610

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