Optimal Allocations with Capacity Constrained Verification

Albin Erlanson () and Andreas Kleiner ()

CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series from University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany

Abstract: A principal has m identical objects to allocate among a group of n agents. Objects are desirable and the principal's value of assigning an object to an agent is the agent's private information. The principal can verify up to k agents, where k

Keywords: Mechanism Design with Evidence; Allocations; Verification (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35
Date: 2025-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des and nep-mic
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